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HOW MUCH CERTAINTY DO WE NEED TO
PUNISH? A REPLY TO KOLBER
Chad Flanders*
Scene: Outside Brooklyn Law School, mid-morning. CHADF, a law professor, reads something on his phone while waiting for an Uber. He is holding a
cup of coffee in his other hand. KOLBERT, also a law professor, is walking
quickly, deep into editing his latest law review article, mostly oblivious to the
outside world. KOLBERT collides with CHADF, causing him to spill coffee all
over his shirt.
C: Hey!
K: Oh, hey. Wow. Oops.
C: That's it?
K: Well, I am in a hurry.
C (recognizing who it is): Kolbert, is that you?
K: Oh, hi ChadF!
C: I was just reading your article on my phone. 1 You know, I have to
write a response to it, but now this.
K: Yes, this. I did say I was in a hurry.
C: And no apology? No offer to buy me another cup of coffee? To help
cleaning this mess up? No nothing?
K: Hey, hold on. Why are you getting so upset?
C: Need I rehearse to you exactly what's just happened here? You
slammed into me, and now I've got-thankfully not too hot-coffee all over
me. A "sorry" would be nice.
K: Aren't you assuming a lot?
C: What?

•

Professor o f Law, Saint Louis University School o f Law.
I. Adam J. Kolber, Pu11ishment and Moral Risk, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 487. I should emphasize that the
words o f "Kolbert" represent my best efforts at approximating what Adam Kolber says in his article and what
he would say in response to some challenges. Adam Kolber should not be taken to necessarily agree with everything that "Kolbert" says.
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K: I said, I think you're making a lot of assumptions. About what I owe
you, about whether I'm responsible.
C (groans): You sound like your article.
K: And why shouldn't I? I believed what I wrote, and as I said, you're
making a lot of assumptions.
C: Like what?
K: That I have free will; that I had the power to do otherwise; that I'm really responsible for running into you; that I deserve your resentment.2
C: If not you, then who?
K: Nobody. You know, stuff just happens. This was dictated by the universe-there was, really, nothing I could do about it.
C: And you're sure about that?
K: Not necessarily. But are you sure about it?
C: I seem pretty sure. I find it hard to believe that you're not responsible.
Hold on, let me cancel my Uber. (Looks down at his phone, and taps a few
icons.)

K: But this is only the tip of the iceberg. You must believe I have free
will, that I'm responsible, and that I deserve some sort of reproach; that you 're
the one who's entitled to give it to me, that I may even owe you a new cup of
coffee. You've asserted all those things, and assumed a lot in the process. Your
confidence, even arrogance, is astounding. 3
C: Is it? I find all of these things coming rather naturally to me.
K: You know as well as I do that it's no argument that these things "come
naturally."
C: I do wonder, however, who has the burden of proof. It seems to me that
you are responsible for running into me and that because of this you owe me at
least an apology, and probably another cup of coffee to replace the one I'm
now wearing on my shirt. You probably ought to feel bad as well.
K: But again, the assumptions! The certainty with which you must hold
them! I would add: the unjustified certainty!
C: That was a problem I had with your article. You ask all these abstract
philosophical questions, and I get i t - I have some doubts. But then I look at the
particular case-take this one, involving you, for instance-and my certainty
returns. You are responsible. I have more confidence in my particular judgments than I do in any of your abstract questions and the doubts they mean to
sow in me. And I think that counts for something. 4
2. Id. at 489-90.
3. At one point in his article, Kolber accuses the resolute retributivist as displaying an almost awesome
arrogance. See Kolber, supra note I, at 528
4. See P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentmem, who makes a similar argument about abstract philosophical questions and concrete cases. Strawson thought it highly unlikely that we could ever be moved to give
up our ordinary responses to people---what Strawson called the "reactive attitudes"-in the face o f a general
philosophical proposition to the effect that "determinism is true." In this, Strawson was surely following David
Hume, who thought that our "animal habits" would be, on the whole, unmoved by philosophical reasoning, and
that this was a good thing. For a general defense o f Straws on' s approach, see my Strawso11 and Buddha 011 the
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K: But you do have an obligation to reconcile these conflicts-your abstract uncertainty, your concrete certainty.
C: I agree; it's just that I don't know that the abstract doubts necessarily
win out. For consider: Why shouldn't the presumption be that you are responsible, absent a good reason to think otherwise? 5 I take it you weren't forced to
run into me, right?
K:No.
C: You aren't insane?
K:No
C: You didn't act in self-defense?
K:No
C: In fact, you had really no excuse or justification for running into me?
K: No. I was just careless. I wasn't paying attention.
C: So, I look at that and say, well, why shouldn't I hold you responsible
for what you did?
K: But determinism might be true! We might be all mindless robots, fated
to act in all these ways!
C: And I agree that might be the case, but that doesn't seem to change my
sense that I am justified in my reaction and to assume that yo11 are responsible
and blameworthy i fyou don't have an exc11se or j11stificationfor your actions. 6
K: OK, look, fine. Sure. I'm not conceding anything. Let's get inside and
I'll buy you a cup of coffee. I don't think we're not going to solve the free-will
determinism problem here. But I think I can run my argument in a different
way, on a different level, and I want to try it on you.
C:OK
They duck into a nearby Starbucks.
C: Alright, what's the argument?
K: So maybe the whole thing about blaming and holding me responsible
for the coffee--I'll take it because the stakes or so low (although geesh, coffee
is sure getting expensive these days). But my article is really about the criminal
law and about the standards of justification for that. And in the criminal law,
the stakes are really h i g h - w e can take away someone's liberty and even their
life. 7 That's why we have the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard at trial. My
point is that we should apply this to every part of the criminal justice system,
Nature o f Persons (manuscript on file with author). A copy of Strawson's great essay can be found at

http://people.brandeis.
edu/-teuber/P ._F ._Strawson_Freedom_&_Resentment.pdf.
S. Charles Lannore suggests this as a general way to think about justification. It is not belief as such,
but changes in belief that need justification, and we need a good reason to change our beliefs. See CHARLES
LARMORE, THE MORALS OF MODERNITY 11 ( 1996).
6. Again, this borrows from Strawson. who distinguishes two ways of attacking someone's responsibility for an act-an abstract philosophical way ("I was detennined, because detenninism is true") and a concrete,
practical way ("I was pushed, I was insane," etc.). Strawson thinks only the latter way really has purchase given
our practices of praise and blame, punishment and reward. See generally Strawson. supra note 4.
7. For this point made in the context of imposing the death penalty, see Sheila Jane Simon, In Sentence
o f Death, There Can Be No Doubt, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Dec. 9, 2001) at 26.
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whether or not we apply it in our day-to-day interactions. What do you make of
that?
C: Hmm, so in our encounter, you'll allow a lower degree of confidence
in things-that you are responsible; that you owe me an apology; that you owe
me a coffee-because after all, it's just a coffee. It's not your life; you're not
going to prison for carelessly running into me.
K: Right.
C: But with the criminal law, we'd better be really sure-not just about
guilt, but about other things too. Did you have free will? Was the law just? Is
the punishment deserved and is it proportionate? When we put things into that
context, we expect a greater certainty. It's like when I ask you if the bank is
open, and you say, "yeah." But then I say, "Are you sure? I've really got to deposit this check before it closes."8 And then maybe you're not so sure-I've
changed the context so that I really need more certainty than you can give.
Your casual confidence just won't do.
K: Yes.
C: We might even contrast this with the civil part of the law. In a civil trial, we do have a lower standard of proof-preponderance of the evidence-because the stakes can be high, but aren't as high as in a criminal trial. We're
shuffling money around, not putting people's liberty at risk.
K: Yeah, sure, that's interesting. I'd have to think about that. I might want
to run a similar argument there as well, but you've got me mostly right.
C: But I want to bring up a concrete example again. Remember Bernie
Madoff?
K: Of course.
C: He almost went to Brooklyn Law School! 9
K: Really? Didn't know that.
C: Anyway. He's in prison now for a long time. He pleaded guilty to securities fraud and will probably die behind bars. He cost a lot of people a lot of
money, and he (let's just stipulate this, although I think it's true) did it out of
greed. He wasn't just careless, or mentally ill; he wanted a kind of lifestyle that
required a lot of money and he used crooked means to get it. My sense is that if
anyone's responsible he is, and he probably deserves not only to pay back the
people he bilked out of their life's savings, he deserves some kind of punishment, some kind of suffering. And so he's not just responsible, he's criminally
responsible.
K: Look, you can pick a case where you have that certainty, but that
doesn't change my larger point. Maybe there's a few cases where we have
enough confidence in punishment, etc., but on the whole, we don't have that

8. I take the example from Keith DeRose, in his discussion of contextualist epistemology. Keith
DeRose, Context11a/ism and Knowledge Attributions. 52 PHIL &PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913, 913 ( 1992).
9. DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE DEATH OF TRUST 34 (2011).
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kind of confidence, or shouldn't have that kind of confidence, in our criminal
justice system.
C: Well, I guess that's sort of an empirical question, isn't it?
K: C'mon. You really think we have Madoff-level confidence in all our
criminal convictions? That's absurd. And that's just as to substantive guilt and
punishment. I'm not even talking about procedural rights, which you surely believe in. You think we give everyone a fair trial?
C: Not at all. 10
K: So I'm saying, we're putting people away for a long time, or even for a
short time. We're making them suffer, not just making them feel bad or apologize. So we need to be sure that they are actually responsible, that they actually
deserve this punishment, and that they've had a fair trial, decent representation,
etc. The odds of that being the case, the odds of that being the case beyond a
reasonable doubt, seem just, well, impossible.
C: But wait a minute. If we concede that maybe some cases meet that,
then I think that does change things. First, we have the question that I've just
mentioned about whether this is true as an empirical matter, that is, how often
we are really super confident that we've got the right guy, gave him a fair trial,
and punished him the right amount. I agree with you that, man, that's hard to
fathom that this really is regularly the case, although maybe it happens more
often than not. But second, as a conceptual matter, it does make it possible to
see your argument as an argument about what we should make our criminal
justice system like. You're setting out the conditions for a just retributive system, an ideal. And so we can say: 'This is what we're aiming for, and we've
got a long way to go." You haven't defeated retribution. You're just saying,
"You know if you want to be a retributivist, here's what your criminal justice
system has to look like, and the kind of certainty it's got to guarantee."
K: That's clever.
C: Thank you, but it's not really my own idea. Jeffrie Murphy made a
similar point in his article on Marxism. 11 Given material inequality in opportunity, the Marxist can say, it would be unjust to punish people on retributive
grounds. It would be unfair. We can't hold them responsible in the status quo.
But that doesn't diminish the appeal of retribution as an ideal. It just says we
must make material conditions a certain way so that retributive punishment becomes justified.
K: But that goal seems so far away. There are so many cases that punishment turns out to be unjustified on my view, where the certainty just isn't there.
We aren't even close.
I 0. For problems plaguing the public defender system in Missouri, see for example Robert Patrick, Public Defe11ders i11 Missouri Say Caseloads Have Them Ovenvorked, a11d Discipline Has Some Scared, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 27. 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/newsllocal/crime-and-courts/public-defenders-inmissouri-say-caseloads-have-them-overworked-and/article_ a2100438-1371-Sc I a-8a02-l 23 7d9d23b05.html.
11. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in WHY PUNISH, How MUCH? 127 {Michael Tonry ed.,
2011).
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C: Again, I agree. The point, again, is conceptual. Are you giving us a
reason to reject retribution or just to try that much harder to get there?
K:Hmmm.
C: Anyway, let's go outside. I've got to get to the airport. (Taps on his
phone.) My Uber will be here in 7 minutes. And amazingly, it looks like my
shirt has dried out.
They head back outside.
K: One last point. Even if you're right about retribution as an ideal, and
I'm not sure you are, you miss that my article is not just against retribution, but
also a case for consequentialism. 12 Retribution seems to require this really high
standard for punishment, and so we just can't punish unless we meet that standard. So maybe we work to meet that standard as an "ideal." But maybe we instead look at consequentialism, which sensibly in my view weighs at both the
risks of bad punishment, but also the risk of nonpunishment. Retribution seems
to leave us paralyzed. Consequentialism can say: "Look, it's bad to punish
wrongly, but sometimes we really have to punish. There are things we lose by
not punishing."
C: Yeah, I had a problem with that too.
K: Really?
C: You seem to acknowledge the retributivist response in your reply to
Larry Solum, but you miss the force of the argument. 13 You stick retributivists
with the idea that it's better to let people go free than to punish them. I'll concede this, even though I don't think it's entailed by their view.
K: Fine.
C: But saying that we should be really worried about punishing the innocent doesn't mean the retributivist has to say that there is no cost to not punishing the guilty. In fact, there is a real cost, and that cost is justice not being done!
So, there's more of a symmetry between the consequentialist and the retributivist here than you let on.
K: What do you mean? For consequentialists, there's a real cost for not
punishing people who commit crimes: in public safety or in deterrence. For retributivists, the cost seems mostly on the side of punishing the innocent.
C: Mostly, but not entirely. Consider this recent quote from the wife of a
slain police officer in St. Louis when she found out that the city wasn't going to
pursue the death penalty. She disagreed. Let me read it to you; a student in my
death penalty seminar just sent it to me. Hold on (CHADF fumbles with his
phone and pulls up the e-mail):
'This is one of those times that you go for the death penalty. You allow a
jury to decide instead of just making a decision arbitrarily not to go for
it,' Elizabeth Snyder said. '[The suspect's] going to get three square
12.
13.

See generally Kolber, supra note I.
Id. at 521-22.

/

No. Spring]

How MUCH CERTAINTY DO WE NEED TO PUNISH?

155

meals a day. He's going to get a comfortable bed, a TV, gym time,
friends . . . everything that my husband does not get. This killer's family
will one day be able to visit him in prison. I have to visit my husband in a
14
grave.'
Now, one doesn't have to agree with this sentiment, and in fact, I don't.
Not only is the death penalty deeply morally problematic, the person who shot
the officer was only 19. But leave that to one side. If we believe there is such a
thing as justice, then the retributivist will be worried that not punishing can
have costs, just as punishing can-the injustice of someone getting away with
doing wrong without paying the price for it. There are risks to letting this happen, too, and so they may tip the balance in some cases-to overcome some o f
our doubts about punishing the innocent. Not always, but sometimes.
K: Is this your Uber?
C: Yeah, it is. Look, nice talking to you. It was fun. The strange thing is, I
actually agree with your conclusion, but I think you get there the wrong way.
You give the retributivist too much room to make his point.
K: Really?
C: Yeah, I'll shoot you an e-mail about it when I get home.
K: Cool.
C: And thanks for the coffee, assuming I can hold you responsible for getting it for me and that you deserve my thanks.
K: Very funny.
Later that day, CHADF sends KOLBERT the following e-mail.
To: Kolbert@brookyn.edu
From: Chadf@slu.edu
Re: Our conversation today, following up
Hey Kolbert,
So I said I was with you in the end, and here's why:
I think where the retributivist really goes wrong is taking our personal relationships as somehow the basis for our system of criminal justice system.
That's why in our conversation earlier today, it was important that I started out
with our little "run-in" as it were. We seem naturally to fall into patterns of
praise and blame; of punishment and reward. I think it would be really odd to
get rid of these things; and it would be really hard. Can I look at my friends and
see them simply as robots? Should I be thinking twice before I get angry at
them or express gratitude? It would be hard to live life that way. 15 How, for example, would love work? So: You ran into me, I got angry, I expect that you
apologize to me. In the regular course of things, you would apologize (as you
14. Andy Banker, Suspect in Blake Synder Killing Won't Face Death Penalty, FOX2NOW ST. LOUIS
(Dec. 8, 20 I 7, 4: IO PM), http://fox2now.com/2017 / 12/08/suspect-in-blake-snyder-killing-wont-face-deathpenalty/.
15. See Chad Flanders, Punishment, Liberalism, and Public Reason, 36 CRIM. J. ETHICS 6I (20 I 7); see
also Strawson and Buddha on the Nature of Persons.
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eventually seemed to do). In a weird way, i f l didn't get mad at you, that would
be treating you as something less than human-if I treated you just like a child,
or like someone who couldn't control his behavior. I think you would expect
me to get mad at you, and would expect yourself to apologize (again, in the ordinary course of things).
The retributivist sees these sorts of interactions as providing a template
for the criminal justice system. The retributivist says that when people do
something really wrong, we should get angry at them and punish them! That's
the direction our sentiments go, and it's part of being a human being. And in
fact, ifwe didn't punish them, we might even be doing them (the wrongdoers) a
disservice by treating them as less than human. 16 Of course, the stakes are
higher when we punish people as opposed to simply resent them, so we should
hold juries and even the entire criminal justice system to a higher standard. But
that doesn't (the retributivist will go on) mean we shouldn't shoot for that ideal.
Justice is at stake! When we don't punish the deserving, we in a way harm
them, and more importantly, leave an injustice unremedied.
The retributivist sees a continuity between our personal relations and our
legal ones, with the legal system in a way mirroring our personal attitudes of
praise and blame, and institutionalizing them. Now, what I want to say is that
the retributivist is right about our personal lives, but wrong about our legal
ones. The legal system shouldn't be viewed as an institutionalization of our attitudes about praise and blame. The legal system should be about public safety,
and in pursuing that goal, we should be worried about things like punishing the
innocent, but we should above all be worried about keeping people free from
harm. It shouldn't be about realizing "justice." I've made this argument in other
articles, in various ways. 17 I won't bore you with it here. But the key point is
that there is a break between responsibility in the personal realm and responsibility in the criminal justice realm.
So what I do with you running into me and what the criminal justice system does with Bernie Madoff are really totally different things because they are
about realizing different values. What I am doing with you and the coffee is in
the personal realm; it's about relating to you as a colleague and as a friend and
as an object of the emotions of love and hate and resentment and gratitude.
With Bernie Madoff, we are really asking about: What do we need to do to deter others from committing this crime? How do we send that message? It's important that Madoffwas guilty, but it's not important that we worry about metaphysical things like desert and justice, or even about our emotions like hate
and resentment. These are things I should worry about when I'm getting mad at
16. This gives rise to the idea of people having a possible "right to be punished." On the "right to be punished," see John Deigh, 011 the Right to Be P1111ished: Some Do11bts, 94 ETHICS 191, 195-97 (1984).
17. See Flanders, P1mishme11t, Liberalism, a11d P11blic Reaso11, s11pra note 15; see also Chad Flanders,
P11blic Reason a11d Public Wro11gs, 55 DIALOGUE 45 (2016); Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?,
2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 309 (2014). I've developed the idea most fully in Political Philosophy as i f Punishment
Mattered (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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you (and you should worry about, too), but with the criminal justice system
they are mostly irrelevant. 18
I think there are real questions---questions you are surely aware of-when
we go consequentialist about criminal justice in this way. It may be hard to
make sense of a lot of our procedural protections, or even the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. We may have to work hard to reconstruct these on
consequentialist grounds or just, as I have urged, see them as important side
constraints in their own right 19 (in other words, as part of a "hybrid" view). The
trick is not to fall into the trap that the goal of criminal justice is to respond to
the personal feelings of injustice, like the ones raised by Snyder, above, that
people doubtless feel. In my view, that really is not the state's job. 20
There is more to be said, of course. I'll leave you with this thought. Retributivists get at some real, and really important, intuitions. I think the retributivist response to your paper may be to agree with most of it, and just say (as I
did in our conversation earlier today) that it's an ideal we have to strive for,
even though there is no guarantee we will ever attain it. To them, this doesn't
diminish its force as an ideal, and they may even grudgingly admit that they
must supply second best theories for our non-ideal world. But they will hang on
to retribution, nonetheless. That's why I have tried to go in another direction.
To acknowledge the force ofretributivist intuitions, but to confine them to their
appropriate sphere.
That's all I have now; hope to talk soon.
Best,
CHADF

18. I discuss one way in which they might be relevant in Adam Smith's Jurisprudence: Resentment, Punishment, and Justice, in ADAM SMITH: HIS LIFE, HIS THOUGHT, HIS LEGACY (Ryan Hanley ed., 2016).
19. Flanders, Can Retribuitivism Be Saved?, supra note 17.

20. Id. at 362 ("Indeed, if we appeal to desert to ground our punishment of individuals . . . we are left
appealing to our personal convictions--however philosophical they may be-and so in a very real sense we are
on our own. We are trying to make the state a vehicle for our own comprehensive doctrine.")

